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Destabilising farmers’ revenues by shifting to direct payments? 
The case of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
 
Abstract 
This paper quantifies the effects of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the instabil-
ity of domestic farmers’ revenues during the period 1986 to 2004. Comparing explicitly the 
situations with and without policy shows that CAP transfers have lowered the variability of 
revenues for major commodities through time. The decomposition of agricultural support al-
lows to reveal the impacts of single instruments on instability and indicates that arable area 
and beef headage payments, introduced in the 1990s, tend to stabilise domestic farmers’ reve-











Since the foundation of the European Community in 1957 one of the major objectives of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been that of market stabilisation (Article 39, Rome 
Treaty). The briefness of this objective gives a certain scope for interpretation and some might 
equate it with revenue stability (Fennell, 1985 p. 268, Rosenblatt et al., 1988 p. 3). The theo-
  2retical and empirical literature on stabilisation has developed enormously in the 1970s and 
1980s with a comprehensive discussion at the micro- and macroeconomic level
1. While there 
is numerous evidence that the CAP has reduced price fluctuations in domestic food markets 
(e.g. Tyers and Anderson, 1992 pp. 65-71), the effects on the variability of farmers’ revenues 
within the European Union (EU) are ambiguous. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981 pp. 26-29) and 
Herrmann and Schmitz (1984 pp. 396-399) conclude that price stabilisation only contributes 
to domestic revenue stabilisation under specific conditions and results cannot be derived a 
priori without empirical data. In the 1990’s and up to now international and domestic stabili-
sation effects arising from EU’s agricultural policy have given much less attention than in the 
two decades before. Particularly there is a lack of empirical studies that assess revenue stabili-
sation effects of the significant reforms in the 1990s, when CAP transfers shifted partially 
from market price support to direct payments. 
This paper seeks to quantify the impacts of transfers arising from the CAP on the variabil-
ity of farmers’ revenues during the period 1986 to 2004. Given the different levels and 
mechanisms of policy interventions across agricultural sectors, stabilisation effects are identi-
fied for selected markets and main instruments. This is done by comparing explicitly situa-
tions with and without CAP support. The organization of this paper is as follows. Section two 
aims at giving a short survey of the CAP mechanisms for key commodities and discusses 
theoretically their implications for farmers’ revenues. The underlying data used for the em-
pirical analysis and the methodology for measuring variation through time is presented in Sec-
tion three. Empirical results are discussed in Section four while the final Section summarises 
the main findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
                                                 
1 A thorough review of the literature on the economics of stabilization is given in Herrmann et al. (1993 pp. 23-
43). Theoretical considerations of commodity market stabilization dealing with welfare gains and market failure 
are compiled in Adams and Klein (1978 pp. 117-191). The book of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) provide a meth-
odology for evaluating alternative price policies aiming at stabilization. 
  32.  CAP policy framework and theoretical implications 
 
 
EU agricultural policy consists of an elaborate set of instruments which attempt to control 
domestic food markets and to support farmers. Over time these have been subject to several 
modifications and today, three fundamentally different policy regime periods of the CAP can 
be identified: i) the “old CAP”, ii) the “new CAP” (cf. Thompson et al., 2002, Swinbank, 
1997 pp. 95-97), and since 2003 iii) the “latest CAP”. 
The “old CAP” is characterised by a system of price support, implemented by administra-
tively intervention buying, import restrictions in the form of variable import levies and export 
subsidies. These provide high levels of protection against world markets to EU farmers and 
reduce the instability of domestic prices. Since its inception in the 1960s and for almost three 
decades, this policy regime only experiences little changes. Modifications concern single mar-
kets, as the introduction of production quotas for milk in 1984. 
The first significant reform of the CAP took place in 1992, in response to the increasing 
budgetary expenses (cf. Hubbard and Ritson, 1997 pp. 86-88) and during the Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Adjustments involve a reduction in support prices (grains by 
35%; beef by 15%), the implementation and increment of arable area and beef headage pay-
ments, to compensate for price reductions, and arable land “set-aside”. For oilseeds deficiency 
payments are replaced by arable area payments. According to the 1993 Uruguay Round 
Agreement of Agriculture, the “new CAP” period also includes the abolition of variable im-
port levies and the application of fixed import taxes, quantity and value restrictions on export 
subsidies, and a reduction of tariffs. In 1999, further changes of the CAP took place, compris-
ing again cuts in support prices (grains by 15%, beef by 20%). Despite these fundamental 
reforms in the 1990s, however, the bulk of transfers to agriculture has still arisen from price 
support (cf. OECD, 2005) and prohibitively high tariffs for many products (Swinbank, 1997 
p. 101) continue to shield the EU from the world market. Moreover, the system of arable area 
  4and headage payments, as price supports, provides incentives to produce. Decreasing effects 
on production have therefore not been clearly visible (Bureau, 2002 pp. 23-25). 
The third period of European agricultural policy commence with the CAP reform of 2003. 
Major elements of the “latest CAP” came into operation on 1 January 2005, as a single pay-
ment scheme, independent from production, replaced most of the direct payments offered so 
far. Changes also consist of further reductions in support prices (butter by 25%, skimmed 
milk powder by 15%, rice by 50%), decreasing direct payments for bigger farms (“modula-
tion”), and granting of direct payments is linked to binding standards (“cross compliance”). 
Because this paper analyses the effects of the changing CAP ex post during the period 
1986 to 2004, it does not account for the implications of the “latest CAP”. The large market 
intervention by the CAP has substantial impacts on the level and variability of farmers’ reve-
nues within the EU and affects directly domestic prices, and domestic supply and demand. 
Revenues are defined as the product of price times the quantity. Given a situation under free 
trade, Figure 1 depicts a simple market model with fluctuating supply and demand curves. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Prices result from the intersection of these two curves and perfectly adjust to shifts in sup-
ply or demand. Thus, prices are inversely proportional to total output and therefore tend to 
stabilise revenues. If agricultural policy instruments fix domestic prices the variance in reve-
nues is not eliminated and may even increase (cf. Newbery and Stiglitz 1981 p. 26). Price 
fixing in combination with production quotas pQ, which control and fix output, also fix reve-
nues. Consequently the policy-induced effect on instability is expected to be the largest on EU 
markets where both of these instruments have been implemented, i.e. sugar and milk. 
In view of the transfer variability of agricultural policy over time, certain effects can be 
assumed. Transfers arising from price supports are expected to be high when world market 
prices are low and vice versa. Arable area and headage payments are positively correlated to 
  5the farm output, they are based on. If the planting area or the number of livestock does not 
vary annually, these payments tend to be constant  
 
 
3.  Data and methodology of measurement 
 
 
In this Section the underlying data is presented and a measure of variability is defined. The 
source of the data material used for the empirical analysis has been annual statistics of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Producer Support 
Estimates (PSE). This indicator measures the monetary value of transfers associated with all 
policy measures affecting agriculture to assist farmers (OECD, 2003 p. 5). Among the list of 
commodities for which the OECD has calculated PSEs six major products - wheat, oilseeds, 
sugar, milk, beef, and pork - were chosen, which account for almost half of the production 
value at farm gate. This selection was also motivated due to the distinct policy schemes for 
these products, providing an evaluation of different levels of market intervention on instabil-
ity. The dataset covers the period from 1986 to 2004 and comprises the significant CAP re-
forms during the 1990s. It is first utilised to construct a time series of farmers’ revenues, ex-
cluding CAP transfers (cf. Figure 2, situation a). 
[Insert Figure 2] 
These “net” revenues serve as the reference situation throughout the following analysis. To 
compare the variability across markets, revenues are calculated for each of the six commodi-
ties under consideration, as well as for the total of all listed by the OECD. Farmers’ revenues 
with total CAP transfers are then derived (situation b) and the impact on instability is com-
puted. To identify the influence of selected instruments, total transfers are decomposed into 
their main components (cf. Love et al., 1997 pp. 180-183). During the period 1986 to 2004 the 
key instruments of the CAP are market price support and, since 1992, increasingly arable area 
  6and headage payments (Figure 3). More than 80 percent of transfers to farmers were based on 
these policy measures. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
In the empirical analysis farmers’ “net” revenues are combined with market price support 
(situation c) and with arable area and headage payments (situation d) to assess if, and to what 
extent, these policy measures have stabilising effects. 
The variability of farmers’ revenues over time is evaluated on the basis of an adjusted co-
efficient of variation. This method follows the proposal by Cuddy and Della Valle (1978) and 
suggests correcting for possible trends in the time series. Hence, it prevents from overestimat-
ing the variability of data that is scattered around a positive or negative trend line. The chosen 
index is defined as follows: 
2
R 1 * CV I − =  
where CV is the coefficient of variation and 
2
R  is the corrected goodness of fit of a trend re-
gression, which best describes farmers’ revenues over time. For determining the trend factor, 
a linear and a nonlinear (log linear) trend function is tested. If the F-test is significant at a 5 
percent level, the null hypothesis (no correlation between time and revenues) is rejected and 
the index proposed by Cuddy and Della Valle is calculated. Otherwise the coefficient of varia-




4. Empirical  results 
 
 
This section presents empirical results on the stabilisation effects of CAP transfers for se-
lected markets. Before focussing on farmers’ revenues, the impacts on the level and variabil-
                                                 
2 For an empirical application of the Cuddy and Della Valle index in assessing the instability of time series data 
see e.g. Koester (1982, pp. 53-55), Herrmann and Weiss (1995) and Aiello (1999). 
  7ity of prices within the EU are addressed. During the period 1986 to 2004 the average level of 
EU agricultural prices for major commodities is in excess of world prices. The nominal pro-
tection coefficients (NPC), defined as the ratio of domestic prices and world prices, are above 
unity for the markets under consideration (Table 1) but vary substantially. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Two different groups can be distinguished regarding the NPC: milk, beef and sugar show ra-
tios close to 2.0 and more, while for wheat, oilseeds, and pork values are less than 1.4. Fol-
lowing Tyers and Anderson (1992 p. 65), these NPCs are compared with world market prices, 
to approximate an indicator for protection. As all correlation coefficients are significantly 
negative, this reflects the fact that EU food markets are insulated, with high NPCs when world 
market prices are low and vice versa. For oilseeds, no price supports but deficiency payments 
were implemented until 1991, and then replaced by arable area payments. Hence, EU pro-
ducer prices for oilseeds have equalled world prices at all times. The NPC of 1.19 attributes to 
the fact that deficiency payments are included in the calculation of this protection measure. A 
comparison of variation indices for the EU and the world market indicates that prices for agri-
cultural commodities are less volatile in the EU. The empirical findings in Table 1 show that 
despite major reforms in the 1990s the CAP still contributes to price stability on domestic 
markets
3. For wheat and beef EU producer prices follow a downward trend, indicating the 
considerable reductions of CAP price support in the 1990s for these products. This confirms 
the findings by Thompson et al. (2000) who conclude for wheat, that the price gap between 
the domestic and world market narrowed in the 1990s, but the stability of EU producer prices 
retained. Regarding the policy-induced effect on instability, the most substantial decline in 
price variability is realized on sugar (-86.6%), milk (-78.0%) and beef (-76.3%) markets, 
which are characterized by high levels of insulation. 
                                                 
3 According to Tyers and Anderson (1992 pp. 66-71) the relative stability of domestic food prices can be partly 
explained in terms of ‘natural’ market conditions, e.g. large marketing margins. Besides, Anderson and Tyers 
(1984 pp. 372-375) show that the volatility in world market prices results to some extent from current agricul-
tural policies. 
  8Having shown that the CAP still stabilises domestic prices, the impacts on EU farmers’ 
revenues are examined next. Results in Table 2 demonstrate that CAP support increases the 
average level of farmers’ revenues significantly. 
[Insert Table 2] 
For all commodities, but pork, farmers’ revenues have almost doubled, or even more. 
Market price support still provides the largest share of support, except for wheat. In this case 
transfers arising from arable area payments exceed price support. The variability of farmers’ 
revenues excluding CAP transfers resembles across single markets and is only half for the 
aggregate of all commodities listed by the OECD. The latter suggests that the instability of 
revenue is lower, if output is diversified. With CAP transfers the variability of revenues is 
reduced compared to the situation excluding support measures. Particularly for milk (-74.7%) 
and beef (-69.7%), followed by wheat (-57.3%) and sugar (-43.9%), instability on domestic 
markets has declined substantially by the CAP. Combining farmers’ revenues with market 
price support, and with arable area and headage payments then, shows that the former stabi-
lises domestic farmers’ revenues more than the latter. In wheat and beef markets the variabil-
ity is less in the price support situation, versus the situation with arable area and headage pay-
ments. For sugar, milk and pork direct payments are used on a limited scale, with marginal 
impacts on revenue instability. 
To examine the relationship between CAP transfers and farmers’ “net” revenues (situation 
a), correlation analysis is used. A negative coefficient means that the policy measure tends to 
contribute to stabilisation and vice versa. The results are summarised in Table 3 and mainly 
confirm the previous findings. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The level of market price support shows a significantly negative correlation with farmers’ 
“net” revenue, except for pork. Thus, price support is high when revenues are low, and de-
clines when revenues rise again. Unlike, significantly positive correlations are found between 
  9revenues and payments based on area planted/animal numbers, except for oilseeds. Total CAP 
transfers were significantly negative correlated only with farmers’ “net” revenues for milk 
and beef. This supports the findings as seen in Table 2, with the most substantial stabilising 
effects of the CAP in these markets. 
Finally, the relationship between EU producer prices and total farm output is examined. 
According to Newbery and Stiglitz (1981 pp. 42-43) the most effective scheme for revenue 
stabilisation would result, if agricultural policy made producer prices inversely proportional to 
output. Table 4 shows that this holds true for wheat and sugar, with significantly negative 
correlations. 
[Insert Table 4] 
However, as described in Table 2 the variation indices of farmers’ revenues with CAP 






This paper has examined the impacts of the CAP on the instability of domestic farmers’ reve-
nues during the period 1986 to 2004. Particularly the major adjustments in the 1990s are ac-
counted for, when the CAP shifted partially from market price support to arable area and 
headage payments. The analysis shows that the CAP lowered price variability substantially in 
the domestic agricultural markets under consideration. The variability of revenue is also low-
ered, but varies a lot across commodities. The most significant reductions in instability are 
realized in milk and beef markets, which are characterized as highly insulated. Decomposing 
total CAP transfers indicates that market price support decreases revenue variability more 
than the instrument of arable area and headage payments. In all markets price support has a 
significantly negative correlation with farmers “net” revenue, whereas for arable area and 
  10headage payments no broad conclusion can be drawn. In general, arable area and headage 
payments cause a lower policy-induced impact on instability than transfers based on market 
price support. 
At the end, the limitations of this analysis need to be considered. As the different revenue 
situations were constructed from the same data, the calculations neither include shifts in the 
supply nor demand functions, resulting from changing policy environments. To account for 





Adams, F. G. and S. A. Klein, 1978. Stabilizing World Commodity Markets: Analysis, Prac-
tice, and Policy. Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 
Toronto, 335 pp. 
Aiello, F., 1999. The Stabilisation of LDCs’ Export Earnings - The Impact of EU Stabex Pro-
gramme. International Review of Applied Economics 13(1), 71-85. 
Anderson, K. and R. Tyers, 1984. European Community Grain and Meat Policies: Effects on 
International Prices, Trade and Welfare. European Review of Agricultural Economics. 11 
(4), 367-394. 
Bureau J.-C., 2002. The EU Common Agricultural Policy: Enlargement, Reform of and Im-
pact on the Western Hemisphere Countries. Inter-American Development Bank, Washing-
ton D.C., United States, 136 pp. 
Cuddy J. D. A. and P. A. Della Valle, 1978. Measuring the Instability of Time Series Data. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 40 (1), 79-85. 
Fennell, R., 1985. A Reconsideration of the Objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Journal of Common Market Studies. 23 (3), 257-276. 
Herrmann, R., K. Burger and H. P. Smit, 1993. International commodity policy: A quantita-
tive analysis. Routledge commodity series, London, Great Britain, 303 pp. 
Herrmann, R. and P. M. Schmitz, 1984. Stabilizing producers’ revenues by fixing agricultural 
prices within the EC? European Review of Agricultural Economics. 11 (4), 395-414. 
Herrmann, R., and D. Weiss, 1995. A Welfare Analysis of the EC-ACP Sugar Protocol. The 
Journal of Development Studies 31 (6), 918-941. 
Hubbard, L. and C. Ritson, 1997. Reform of the CAP: From Mansholt to Mac Sharry. In 
Ritson, C. and D. R. Harvey (eds.), The Common Agricultural Policy. CAB International, 
London, United Kingdom, pp. 81-94. 
  11Koester, U., 1982. Policy Options for the Grain Economy of the European Community: Im-
plications for Developing Countries. Research Report 35, International Food Policy Re-
search Institute, Washington, United States, 90 pp. 
Love, B., M. S. Boyd, R. M. A. Loyns and R. Gibson, 1997. Testing the effectiveness of gov-
ernment transfers for agricultural revenue stabilisation: the case of the Western Canadian 
grain sector. Food Policy. 22 (2), 175-184. 
Newbery, D., M., G. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1981. The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization: A 
Study in the Economics of Risk. Oxford University Press, New York, United States, 462 
pp. 
OECD, 2003. Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, OECD Database: User’s Guide. 
OECD, Paris, France, 59 pp. 
OECD, 2005. Producer and Consumer Support Estimates Database, 1986-2004. 
OECD, various issues. Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries - Monitoring and Evaluation. 
OECD, Paris, France. 
Rosenblatt, J., T. Mayer, K. Bartholdy, D. Demekas, S. Gupta and L. Lipschitz, 1988. The 
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community - Principles and Consequences. 
International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 2., 70 pp. 
Swinbank, A., 1997. The New CAP. In Ritson, C. and D. R. Harvey (eds.), The Common Ag-
ricultural Policy. CAB International, London, United Kingdom, pp. 95-111. 
Thompson, S. R., W. Gohout and R. Herrmann, 2002. CAP Reforms in the 1990s and their 
Price and Welfare Implications. Journal of Agricultural Economics. 53 (1), 1-13. 
Thompson, S. R., R. Herrmann and W. Gohout, 2000. Agricultural Market Liberalization and 
Instability of Domestic Agricultural Markets: The Case of the CAP. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 82 (3), 718-726. 
Tyers, R. and K. Anderson, 1992. Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative Assess-
ment. Cambridge University Press, 444 pp. 
  12Table 1  Impacts of the CAP on EU price variability for major commodities, 1986-2004 
  Wheat  Oilseeds  Sugar  Milk  Beef  Pork 
NPC  1.38 1.19 2.53 1.99 2.03 1.22 
Correlation NPC and 













World market price        
  Variation index  16.5
  21.9 20.2 18.3 20.3 19.4 
  Instability measure  CV  I 
L, p CV I 
L, p CV CV 
EU producer price        
  Variation index  7.3  21.9  2.7  4.0  4.8  11.9 
  Instability measure  I 
LL, n I
 L, p I 
L, n I 
LL, p I 
LL, n CV 
  Policy-induced effect 
on instability (%) 
 











Notes: NPC is the nominal protection coefficient, *** ( **, * ) is statistically significant at the 99.9 - (99 -, 95 - ) percent 
level. CV is the coefficient of variation, I 
L is the Cuddy-Della Valle index adjusted for a linear trend, I 
LL is the Cuddy-Della 
Valle index adjusted for a log linear trend, p is a positive and n a negative trend regression. The policy-induced effect on 
instability is calculated as: [price instability with CAP - world market price instability] / world market price instability * 100. 
Source: Calculations based on OECD data material. 
 
Table 2  Impacts of CAP transfers on farmers’ revenue variability, 1986-2004 
  Wheat  Oilseeds  Sugar  Milk  Beef  Pork  Total 
Farmers’ revenues excluding CAP transfers (situation a) 
  Arithmetic mean (EURm)  10 446   2 746  2 470  19 070  9 925  18 416  170 352 
  Variation index  19.2  15.1 18.7 16.6 20.1 16.8  7.7 
  Instability measure  I 
LL, p I 
LL, p CV I 
L, p CV CV I 
L, p
Farmers’ revenues with CAP transfers (situation b) 
  Arithmetic mean (EURm)  19 094  5 565  5 472  37 181  25 551  22 066  264 455 
  Variation index  8.2 12.4  10.5 4.2  6.1 11.8 3.8 
  Instability measure  I 
LL, p CV CV  I 
LL, p I 
LL, p I
LL, p I 
LL, p
  Policy-induced effect 















Farmers’ revenues with Market Price Support (situation c) 
  Arithmetic mean (EURm)  13 647  -  5 127  35 336  19 686  21 270  232 989 
  Variation index  14.5  -  6.7  3.9  5.3  11.6  4.2 
  Instability measure  CV  -  CV  I 
LL, p I 
LL, n I
LL, p I 
LL, p
  Policy-induced effect 















Farmers’ revenues with payments based on area planted/animal numbers (situation d) 
  Arithmetic mean (EURm)  14 907  5 242  2 562  19 252  13 947  18 526  187 731 
  Variation index  15.9  12.3 18.9 16.5 14.2 16.8  7.2 
  Instability measure  I 
LL, p CV  CV  I 
L, p I 
LL, p CV  I 
L, p
  Policy-induced effect 















Notes: EUR is Euro and m is million. Remaining symbols are the same as those in Table 1. The policy-induced effect on 
instability is calculated according to that in Table 1 and refers to revenues without CAP transfers. For oilseeds, in situation d, 
payments based on output were used during the period 1986-1991, which were replaced by arable area payments in 1992. 
Source: Calculations based on OECD data material. 
  13Table 3  Correlation Coefficients between farmers’ “net” revenues and transfers arising 
from selected EU agricultural policy measures, 1986-2004 
            Farmers’ revenue without CAP transfers 
  Wheat  Oilseeds  Sugar  Milk  Beef  Pork  Total 
Total CAP transfers  0.05  - 0.43  - 0.34  - 0.92***  - 0.65**  - 0.06  0.26 
Market Price Support  - 0.74***  -  - 0.71***  - 0.94***  - 0.77***  - 0.16  - 0.85*** 

















Notes: *** ( **, * ) is statistically significant at the 99.9 - (99 -, 95 - ) percent level. 
Source: Calculations based on OECD data material. 
 
Table 4  Correlation Coefficients between total farm output and agricultural prices within 
the EU, 1986-2004 
            Total farm output (quantity) 
  Wheat  Oilseeds  Sugar  Milk  Beef  Pork 
EU producer Price  - 0.65**  0.26  - 0.77***  0.12  - 0.09  -0.30 
Notes: *** ( **, * ) is statistically significant at the 99.9 - (99 -, 95 - ) percent level. 
Source: Calculations based on OECD data material. 
  14Figure 1  Effects of price fixing and production quotas on farmers’ revenues 
p 
 
Notes: p is the EU price, pF is the fixed EU price, q is the quantity produced, qQ is the production quota, D is the demand 
curve, and S is the supply curve. Farmers’ revenues are defined as p * q. 
 
Figure 2  Decomposition of farmers’ revenue 
situation    Farmers’ revenue     
(a)    - excluding CAP transfers  =  p
w * q 
(b)    - including total CAP transfers  =  p
w * q + (p
d – p
w) * q + DP + B 
(c)    - including market price support  =  p
w * q + (p
d – p
w) * q 
(d)    - including payments based on 





w * q + DP 
Notes: p is the price, q is the quantity produced, d and w refer to the domestic and world market, respectively. DP are direct 
payments based on area planted/animal numbers, and B are all other forms of budgetary-financed support to farmers. 
 







  1986   1988   1990   1992   1994   1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Other forms of payments
Area and headage payments
Market price support
 
Source: Calculations based on OECD data material. 
S2  S1  D2  D1 
pF 
q
qQ 
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